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FIGURING RHETORIC:
FROM ANTISTROPHE TO APOSTROPHE THROUGH
CATASTROPHE
Abstract. This essay explores rhetoric tropologically through various
strophes: antistrophe, catastrophe, and apostrophe. Our purpose is to
delineate problems and possibilities that these tropes pose for rhetoric in
an effort to create new rhetorics We seek to display the antistrophic and
catastrophic figurations of rhetoric and then use visual lenses of
photography and cinema to disrupt the figurations. Following the
disruption, we seek to heighten sensibilities to other figurations, in
particular an apostrophic figuration. We cast apostrophe as a figure for
change because it marks a deeply felt turn toward difference and otherness.
Turned as such, rhetoric becomes erotic.

A

s our title indicates, this essay explores rhetoric tropologically through
various strophes (turns/figures). 1 In troping or figuring rhetoric, we
present possibilities of what rhetoric can become. In working through these
possibilities, we interanimate rhetoric's theory and practice through
figuration. To figure as such is to draw upon the unique resources from
within rhetoric.2 Moreover, to figure as such is to invent (find and create)
the possibilities unrecognized as yet in rhetoric. Such an invention
committed to creating new theories of rhetoric so as not "to betray our
opportunity," some- thing Giles Wilkeson Gray warned rhetoricians about as
early as 1923 (266). Our aim, then, is to clear the way by engaging regions
of rhetoric through figuration. Our approach is not to pin down figures, as
traditional taxanomic approaches have done, but to animate them and in
tum, extend the line of rhetoric.
We begin with antistrophe. Antistrophe is the figure that dominates the
rhetorical tradition. As we will show, promoting rhetoric as dialectic through
antistrophe has, over the centuries, poisoned our sensibilities. In effect,
amplifying rhetoric as antistrophe is rhetoric's catastrophe.
Next we explore this catastrophe. We find in Aristotle's Rhetoric that a
subset of antistrophe is catastrophe ( 1409b.23- l 4 l Oa.5).3 Although Aristotle
equates catastrophe with pleasure that comes from bringing something to an
end, we, the inheritors of rhetoric, amplified by antistrophe, pay the price for
this pleasure. To explore this price, we break out of the way rhetoric is
traditionally talked about so as to see rhetoric from a radically different
perspective.
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Equipping ourselves with Susan Sontag, Roland Barthes, Walter Benjamin,
and Boris Eichenbaum, we find photography and cinema particularly rich
perspectives with which to make our break and to bring our understanding and
experiences of rhetoric into focus. Photography and cinema are particularly
sharp lenses from which we gain a heightened perception of rhetoric as
antistrophe. We then use this perception to disrupt the amplification of
rhetoric as antistrophe. Through this disruption, which we refer to as "katastrophe,” we can see anew the resources of figuration available for extending
rhetorical theory. We envision kata-strophe as transposing rhetoric and getting us out of rhetoric 's promotional contract with antistrophe.
If kata-strophe transposes rhetoric's catastrophe as antistrophe,
apostrophe is the turn to rhetoric 's new life. Apostrophe is literally turning
away from rhetoric as antistrophe and its subset catastrophe. In turning away,
apostrophe arouses the incidental, the other, and it is there, as Walter
Benjamin suggests, that the "future is nesting" ("A Short History of
Photography" 202).
Antistrophe
We are all familiar with the representation of rhetoric as the antistrophe
of dialectic. It is after all the first line of Aristotle's Rhetoric: Rhetoric is the
counterpart [antistrophos] to dialectic" (1354a.l ). We are also familiar with
the many interpretations of antistrophe. As John Rainolds said, "There are as
many interpretations of this little word [. . .] as there are interpreters" (Green,
Oxford lectures 105). However, we comment on how these "many
interpretations" of rhetoric as antistrophe are actually "one."
Gram matically speaking, rhetoric is the subject and antistrophos is
the predicate nominative in the sentence: "Rhetoric is a counterpart of
dialectic." What does it mean to posit, at the structural level, a
transformational equivalence between rhetoric and antistrophe? What
kind of relationship does the Subject-Predicate Nomi native (SPN) signify?
One way the "gram- mar question " is answered is to posit an identical
exchange: The articular subject -- "(the) rhetoric'' -- and the predicate
nominative -- "antistrophos" – is a convertible proposition. In his
commentary The Rhetoric of Aristotle, E. M. Cope suggests as much.
"When applied in its strict and proper sense, it [antistrophos] denotes an
exact correspondence in detail, as a facsimile or counterpart" (1.1). By
"strict and proper sense," Cope is referring to the grammatical structure
of SPN -- subject plus a predicate nominative -as a "logic" (1.1 ).4 So
structured through antistrophos, rhetoric and dialectic then become
"convertible ," which is to say rhetoric and dialectic are "identical in
meaning" and "precisely similar in all respects" (1.1). That rhetoric and
dialectic are "identical" is intended to reveal that, in spite of specific
differences, both are "opposites in the same row" (1.2). That is, rhetoric
and dialectic live together under "one genus, proof ' (1.2). Although they
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live together under "one genus , proof ' and are "precisely similar," rhetoric is
subordinate and, therefore, is reduced to living at "a lower level" (1.2).
Lexically, antistrophos combines the preposition "anti," which ranges
in meaning from "opposite" to "instead," with the noun "strophe," which
ranges from ''trick" to "turn." Antistrophos traffics in the lexical nuances of
both "a11ti" and "strophe." Some commentators, according to Rainolds (Green,
Oxford Lectures 105-109) consider "anti" as "opposite" and support this with
Aristotle's expression that tyranny is the converse of monarchy (Politics
I295a.18) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' illustration that good is the converse of evil (14). This treatment of "anti" leads to an interpretation of
rhetoric as the converse of dialectic. Others, who rely on "anti" as "instead"
(e.g., Averroes, Trebizond, and Alexander) indicate that rhetoric can "stand
in for" or "act in place of ' dialectic (Green, Oxford Lectures I05-107). If this
use of "anti" is combined with the use of "strophe" as "trick" the result
resembles a Platonic understanding of rhetoric as a counterfeit art (Gorgias
464b8, 465c1-3). From this reasoning, dialectic "stands in for" rhetoric but
rhetoric may not "stand in for" dialectic. Some commentators, however,
remark that Aristotle's use of antistrophos is likely meant to signal his
rejection of the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates
in the Gorgias (Kennedy 28-29). Many commentators stage "strophe" as
"turn," as in the choral strophe, or turns, in various songs and dances in
drama. Along these lines J. H. Freese (translator) explains antistrophos as
counterpart: "Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and
corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a choral ode" (2).
Freese is not alone. Translators from the beginning of the nineteenth
century to the end of the twentieth century draw upon the strophe or
movement of the choral dance, the returning of the chorus to answer a
previous strophe, to explain the relation of rhetoric to dialectic (Cope 1:
Grimaldi 1-2: Kennedy 28-29).5
Despite differences with respect to "anti" and "strophe" among
interpreters, one thing seems to be shared by all: Aristotle "indicates a
resemblance and extraordinary affinity between the art of rhetoric and
dialectic" (Green, Oxford Lectures 107). This shared view reduces "many
interpretations" to one. In effect, these "many interpretations" are effusions of
a single interpretive industry . This industry manufactures a rhetoric that is
one with dialectic bound up in a system of creating knowledge
(epistemology). The effusion of a single interpretive industry, Susan Sontag
writes in Against /11- terpretatio11, "is like the fumes of an automobile and of
heavy industry" (17). Sontag's technologically-based metaphor brings before
the eyes how a techne of rhetoric bound to dialectic through an antistrophic
projection "poisons our sensi bilities" ( 17).
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Catastrophe
Herein begins our experience of the catastrophe of rhetoric. As
mentioned earlier, Aristotle establishes a relationshi p between antistrophe
and catastrophe. Catastrophe is a subset of antistrophe (Rhetoric
1409a.26-27) and is the figure that "turns down." Our tradition is most
familiar with catastrophe through Aristotle 's lexis katestrammene (a
participle of katastrepho, the verbal form katastrophe ). 6 Katestrammene
is Aristotle's word for periodic style, one that brings an audience to a
pleasant end or rest. Civic discourse, for example, adopts a periodic style as
opposed to the paratatic style of poetic discourse and contrasts with lexis
eirmene or the ru nning style. However because of the familiarity that lexis
katestrammene holds in our tradition, we are unable to see how bringing
an audience to a pleasant end or rest misses opportunities. We miss these
opportunities because the effusion of the interpretative industry has
reduced our ability to see more, hear more, feel more, about our subject - something Sontag insists must happen to fight through the smog of
interpretation (23). We turn to photography and cinema as providers of a
heightened perception of and explanation for the catastrophe of rhetoric. In
this state of heightened perception, an opportunity to disrupt catastrophe
emerges. We mark this disruption as "kata- strophe."
PHOTOGRAPHY

In the following passage, Roland Barthes approaches photography
through rhetoric.
The unary Photograph has every reason to be banal, "Un ity" of
composition being the first rule of vulgar (and notably, of academic)
rhetoric: 'The subject,' says one handbook for amateur photographers,
'Must be sim ple , free of useless accessories: this is called the Search
for Unity. ( Camera Lucida 41 )
The rhetoric which Barthes brings before our eyes is that of oral and
written composition. This rhetoric is indeed driven by a search for a unity
manifest in the teaching of a techne for constructing coherent messages and
compelling arguments with clear theses, logical structure, solid development,
and eloquent expression of the whole message. Practically speaking, this is
the rhetoric of persuasion that must work to align the position(s) of the
audience with that of the rhetor in such a way as to preclude all potential
gaps, to prevent all interruptions and annoyances in aligning the audience
with the rhetor. In Barthes' language, the search for unity is the very thing that
makes both photography and rhetoric banal, vulgar, and academic. We want
to use Barthes' discussion regarding the search for unity as an ekphrasis of
the catastrophe of rhetoric.
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To follow Barthes ' discussion of the search for unity, we begin by
considering what he calls "the unary character of the studium."7 Unary is a
transliteration of the French word "unaire." This term names something that
transforms reality without doubling it, without making it vacillate. The term
unaire belongs to generati ve grammar and is used to mark a transformation
where a single series is generated by the base (Camera 40-41). The
interrogative, passive, negative, and emphatic transformations are examples
of "unaire.” A unary system, as Barthes stretches the term, proceeds
through amplification, and, in doing so, enhances its power of cohesion
(Camera 41). A unary system is a catastrophe because it kills incidentals,
it ends possibilities, it subdues all that which undercuts the creation of a
unified, compelling , and coherent hu man experience and understanding.
The studium is ultimately always coded and belongs to the "vision " of
the photographer (Camera 51). To attend to the studium is to attend to the
photographer's attempt to transfer a vision. On the contrary, to attend to what
Barthes calls the photograph's "punctum ," which is never coded as such, is to
attend to one 's own experience evoked by the visual. "Ce "detail" est le
punctum (ce qui me point) " (Barthes, la Chambre Claire 71 ). 8 Punctum is a
Latin term from the verb pungo. This verb takes a tropical or figurative
sense ranging from prick, sting, vex, grieve, trouble, disturb, afflict, mortify,
and annoy. The punctum of a photograph is an incidental or detail that
punctuates , disturbs, and interrupts one 's experience of the studium of the
photograph . If details in a photograph do not "disturb" or "prick" him,
Barthes remarks, it is doubtless because the photographer has put them there
intentionally as part of the studium ( Camera 47).
Barthes exemplifies punctum and studium with various critiques of
photographs he loves, including Lewis H. Hine's photograph of two idiot
children. Barthes comments that he hardly sees the monstrous heads and
pathetic profiles which he notes belong to the studium. Instead, what he
sees are the off-center details, the little boy's huge collar, and the girl's
finger bandage. For Barthes, the punctum of these photographs cannot be
named "idiocy," a name that can be applied readily to the studium. In point
of fact, Barthes notes that the inability to name the punctum is a good
symptom of disturbance ( Camera 50-51 ).
Through the discussion of the studium as contrasted with the punctu m,
we have a heightened sensation of rhetoric's catastrophe, the act of rhetoric
being "turned down," subdued, reduced , and concluded. Rhetoric's
catastrophe is to be unary, to be only an antistrophe to dialectic. To be a
servant of dialectic is a catastrophe for rhetoric in at least two ways: First,
rhetoric is assimilated into the unary system of rationality to such an extent
that its possibilities smolder. Then, in the smolder, rhetoric assimilates the
"other,"
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Whether through the practice of creating coherent and compelling
accounts of the necessity of a thesis or through a tradition of emphasizing
the telos of rationality and the service of speech in reaching this telos.
Thus from the passive to the amplified , rhetoric transforms from a single
base (the episte-mological ) to, in turn, "turn down"- in other words, to
subdue, reduce, and concl ude "the other."
How can rhetoric avoid the catastrophe of being unary? We look again
to Barthes. Camera Lucida ends by making explicit the idea implicit
throughout, namely that society's means by which lo tame the madness of
photography is art ( Camera 117). The art of photography consists of
techniques that can be named, like the "Search for Unity." Naming fosters
coherence. The art of photography belongs to the photographer's vision or
studium. The studium fosters control. For Barthes, photography is much less
of an experience when it is transformed through a search for unity into an
art, which is nothing less than a mechanism of coherence and control. Thus,
photography is better left to madness than art (Camera 117-119). Perhaps the
same can be said about rhetoric. Rhetoric is better when it cannot deny,
ignore, or subsume who or what is idiosyncratic (the idios if you will.) Do
we dare experience rhetoric beyond antistrophe in the same way Barthes
wishes to experience photography beyond the studium? Do we dare turn away
from the art of rhetoric ? Do we dare experience the eros of rhetoric?
Incidentally, Barthes describes his rejection of unary photography in terms
of erotics. Barthes' love for photography moves him to reject its reduced,
unary form. For Barthes, the quintessential unary photograph is the
pornographic one (Camera 41ff.). There is no punctum i n pornography. It is
all studium. An erotic photograph, on the contrary, by not making the
sexual organs into a central object, takes the spectator outside its frame, and
it is there that the spectator animates the photograph and that it animates the
spectator. The punctum of an erotic photograph, then, "is a kind of subtle
beyond - as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see"
(Camera 59).
Would erotic rhetoric, then, turn away from a search for unity to take the
listener outside of the frame, whether the frame of a thesis being presented
for the listeners' assent or the frame of rhetoric as antistrophe? Could the
listener, there, outside the frame animate rhetoric and rhetoric animate the
l istener? Could the punctum of rhetoric in terms of erotics, then, be a kind of
subtle beyond - as if the message launched desire beyond what it directs
us to hear? What if rhetoric launched such a desire beyond that of rhetoric
as antistrophe?
EXPERIENCING RHETORIC AS CINEMA

Barthes ' critique of u nary photography helps us to see the search for

\

35

unity as too controlling, too determining, too unfortunately free of
accessories. To apprehend the method of achieving such unity, we turn to
cinema. In turning to the most restrained of the visual arts – cinema - we
aim to frame the way in which rhetoric has been amplified and reduced by
antistrophe.
Cinema, which employs a director of photography, is even more unified
and controlled than (unary) photography. A director of photography in
cinema might shoot instances of reality but no detail is left to chance.
Film making, Robert B. Ray points out, has from the first "been shaped
by the answers proposed to a set of fundamental questions" (33). How
does the viewer make sense of a film? How does the viewer process
cinematic information? The answers that Boris Eichenbaum, a Russian
Formalist, gave during the experimental phase of Soviet cinema turn out to
be copious in their associations for rhetoric. Eichenbaum explained that he
studied "oratorical speech because it was close to practical speech" (845).9
Drawing on Eichenbaum, Ray and Paul Willemen explain how a viewer
makes sense of a film through speech. Specifically, viewers accompany
their film watching with an "inner speech." Although film theorists never
say so, the notion of inner speech suggests that processing information in a
film is analogous to that which rhetoric calls an enthymeme. 10 How is inner
speech, the method of processing information in a film, enthymematic? As
the audience supplies the connection from the suppressed major premise to
obtain a conclusion, so inner speech supplies the connection between
separate shots to make sense out of disparate ones.
The way Ray explains how inner speech works to create a meaning system could be substituted for an explanation for how enthymemes work to
prod uce conviction. Here is Ray's explanation:
A useful example [of inner speech] occurs in Born Free’s opening
scene which cuts back and forth between a woman's washing clothes
in a river and a stalking lion, apparently intent on unseen prey. With
the woman and the lion never appearing together in any frame, the
sequence culminates in three shots: the lion springs, the woman turns
and screams, and the river rushes away, now littered with clothes and a
spreading red stain. (33)
Enthymematically speaki ng, the three disparate shots consist of a major
premise [lion hunts prey], a minor premise [woman screams], and a
conclusion [woman is dead] that in turn creates a meaning system in the
language of film. The meaning system is an effect of images appearing
nowhere (33). There is no shot of a lion eating woman. The conclusion,
lion kills woman, occurs only in the mind of the viewer, whose inner
speech responds to the matching of images.
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The enthymematic power of cinema works through what is called the
"rule of matching" in film making. By matching two shots -- "lion
hunts prey" and '·woman is dead" -- the director produces the effect of
knowledge. For matching to work successfully, all images in each match
must be controlled . The process of inner speech can be interrupted if, for
example, the image , "lion hunts prey” is shot in Africa while the image of the
river rushing with blood is shot by a river in North America. One
incidental -- a small Eastern Redbud l e a f left floating on t h e banks
of the r i v e r -- can create a powerful disturbance in the process of inner
speech. Although all images are matched, one floating leaf can disturb the
meaning of a lion hunting in Africa and killing prey by a river in North
America. The effect of knowledge is, therefore, a "capturing" or
"shooting" of truth. What is most feared, then, in film making, is the
capacity for an image to go astray, to drift, and then to perturb and finally
undercut the meaning system (Ray 94-119: cf. Barthes “Third Meaning"
31 7-334 ).
What if we were to reverse the formalist method and imagine oratorical
speech/rhetoric through the visual med um of film? And what if this film of
rhetoric were produced in response to two questions: How does an audience
make sense of rhetoric? How does an audience process its truth? As film
makers answer with the idea of inner speech, we answer them with the idea
of the enthymeme. The enthymeme captures probable truth through a
process of providing apparently contingent premises to which the audience
supplies connections and conclusions . The enthymeme invites a conclusion
by allowing the audience to match contingent premises. However, the
contingency of the major premise behaves as a universal, whether
invariably or usually, thus inviting a particular matching (Aristotle,
Rhetoric 1357b.35-36: cf. Metaphysics 1023b.29: Posterior Analytics
73b.26). Grimaldi notes “’Children love their parents:’ it is a probability
because [it is] a general observation u niversal in form" (cited in Kennedy
43 n. 63). Although the enthymeme is said to be constructed from
contingency, this contingency is a reduction and a stabilization of what all
-- the wise, the majority (Aristotle Topics, 1.1: cf. Kennedy 41) -- believe
"for the most part." Rhetoric does not theorize about each opinion -- what
may seem so to Socrates or Hippias -- but about what seems true to
people of a certain sort, as is also true with dialectic (Kennedy 41: n.
56). Viewed as such, a cinema of rhetoric as antistrophe to dialectic
produces the enthymeme as syllogismos ( Rhetoric 1358a.19). Once again
rhetoric is amplified through dialectic .
In this production of rhetoric as film, the enthymeme matches shots of
contingency with shots of regularity, repeatability, and predictability. As the
film maker fears an image -- Redbud leaf -- going astray and
perturbing and undercutting the meaning system, so the rhetor fears being
lead astray by irregularities and unpredictabilities, which would constitute,
at best, false
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reasoning (paralogos ) and, at worst, silly talk (paralerema ) ( Rhetoric
1356b.35). The core of rhetoric as antistrophe links with a fear of the
accidental, the drive toward rationality, the exalting of organization.
Although this "seeing" of rhetoric through the lens of antistrophe sets the
standard of objective truth on which rhetoric can build its citadel of reason,
it compromises the idea of the accidental and the contingent upon which
rhetoric could distinguish itself from dialectic. Is not rhetoric the art most
concerned with the contingent? In the process of occupying the citadel of
reason, has not the interpretative industry compromised and reduced our
ability to respond to the idea of contingency? We are now in a position to
invoke Walter Benjamin's definition of a catastrophe: "to have missed the
opportunity" ("N" 23). In other words, a catastrophe is the inverse of
kairos, seizing opportunities.

Kata-strophe
Insofar as photography and cinema have heightened our perception of the
catastrophe of rhetoric, they have created a disturbance in the unary system of rhetoric as
antistrophe to dialectic. We imagine this disturbance at the most basic level of the word:
“catastrophe” disrupted is “kata-strophe.” To understand “kata-strophe” we turn now to the
quadripartia ratio, the four traditional rhetorical systems of change governed by “kata.”
(See figure 1.1). Four our present purposes, we will focus our attention on the interactions
between two of these four systems of change: substitution (kata enallagen) and
transposition (kata metathesin).

Rhetorical Systems of Change
Subtraction

Substitution
Kata evallagen

Kata aveian

synonymia
anacoloutha
acyrologia

syncope
restricio
anesis

...

...

Addition
Kata
pleonasmon
epitheton
metaplasm
polysyndeton

Transposition
Kata metathesin

anastrophe
tmesis
parenthesis

...

...

Figure l . Adapted from Gideon O. Burton, "Silva Rhetoricae," cf.
Quintilian 5.38
Substitution is the system of change governing the inter-articulation of
rhetoric and dialectic through antistrophe. The basic figure of this interarticulation is synonymia which shapes rhetoric and dialectic's interchange-
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ability. In the wake of a disturbance of this interchangeability (caused by
seeing rhetoric/dialectic through photography/cinema), we are now in a
position to see the insufficiency of this system of substitution as rhetoric 's
exclusive system of change. This insufficiency is an effect of this system
having been reduced to a unary system.
One measure of the unary construction of this system is the power
synonymia possesses to forge a unity between rhetoric and dialectic. However, synonymia is not the only figure moving this system of change. Others
such as anacoloutha denote inconsistency and impropriety, not
interchangeability, as yet other movements of the system of substitution.
By intra-ani mating the figures within the system of su bstitution synonymia and anacoloutha – we can recognize how profound the
connection is between the system of substitution and other systems of change,
namely (for our present purposes) the system of transposition, in which
inconsistency moves more freel y.1 The interactions of these figures move the
system of substitution out of itself and into another, resulting in an interanimation of the systems of substitution and transposition.
Transposition is the system of change characterized by the figure
anastrophe. This figure marks a disordering of an accepted relationshi p
between two elements of a proposition. Traditionally, Anastrophe marks
a change in position, but to call this change of position simply an i nversion
or a reversal is to miss the radical opportunity for change that other figures
in the system of transposition animate, such as tmesis which creates a cut in
an accepted order. The interaction of these two figures -anastrophe and
tmesis -- within the system of transposition creates change marked by both
destruction (cutting) and creation (change in meaning). To return once
more to a consideration of transposition at the most basic level of the word,
"catastrophe" disrupted is "kata-strophe." The h yphen is a cut (tmesis) that
destroys an old meaning (e.g. catastrophe) and creates a new meaning (e.g.
kata-stro-phe).
Perhaps the most common way of understanding transposition is through
the image of fire. Across time and genres of inquiry into the human
condition, fire is an ever-present topic of destruction, cunning intelligence,
and life. In Heraclitus, fire is paradoxical, both a counterpoint theme of unity
and totality (Kahn, 271 -272), as well as the generative force of the cosmos:
'The ordering (kosmos), the same for all, no god nor man has made, but i t
ever was and is and will be: fire ever li vi ng, kindled in measure and in
measures going out" [XXXVII (D. 30), in Kahn 132]. In mythology, the
fire-thief Prometheus stole the element from Vulcan and gave it to the human
race. This gift made fire not only a resource for human beings but also for
cunning intelligence. Philosophers and poets use fire to rekindle their topics.
Alexander Pope, in his Preface to the llliad speaks of the genius of Homeric
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poetry as an unequaled fire of the most animated nature imaginable. Through
the fire of Homer, ". . . everything moves, everything lives, and is put into
action" (qtd. in Wace and Stubbings 1). And in Plutarch, "Nothing so much
resembles a living creature as fire does" (qtd. in Detien ne and Vernant 281).
Clearly the history of ideas speaks through fire, and rhetoric should be no
exception. To no small degree, fire is an apt image for the transposition of
which we speak.2 This transposition provides new opportunities for figuring
rhetoric. We will explore these opportunities provided by the system of
transposition through the figure of apostrophe.

Apostrophe
While apostrophe is most commonly recognized as a punctuation mark,
we transpose the punctuation mark with the rhetorical figure. As a
punctuation mark, the apostrophe is a substitution marking possession and
contraction (e.g., "it's" can mean either "of it" or "it is"). As a rhetorical
figure, the apostrophe is a transposition, a "turning away." This turning away
takes on several interactive forms, traditionally linked in taxonomies to four
figures: 1) parenthesis; 2) heteroiosis; 3) alloiosis; and 4) metabasis. (See
figure 1.2). To see how these four figures turn and move is like the
experience of being in a hall of mirrors. To manage this experience of being
in such a hall, we will divide these four figures into two sets of moves, the
moves within a system of substitution first (figure 1 .3), then within a system
of transposition (figure 1 .4).

Four Figures to Which Apostrophe ls Linked
Parenthesis
aside
incidental

Metabasis
crossing over

Heteroiosis

Alloiosis

things or people
of a different
kind
difference

otherness
difference

Figure 1.2. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson
Apostrophe takes the form of parenthesis. In a word, parenthesis is an
interpolation. Understood within the system of substitution, this interpolation
introduces something additional or extraneous, wrongly inserted. Within the
system of substitution, parenthesis as apostrophe is often considered puerile,
marking the agency of the speaking subject as insufficient. Consider as an
example the following apostrophe from Homer's Odyssey. When Odysseus
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is thrown against the cliffs by Poseidon's enraged sea, he cries out: "Hear
me, oh River, whosoever you are ... I come to you seeking to escape" (5.445).
The address to the river signifies Odysseus ' lack of agency, his dependence
on an absent, inanimate other for assistance . From within the system of
substitution, Odysseus' apostrophizing reveals him to be like a helpless
child. The puerile nature of apostrophe, typical of epic, brought forth titters
from later audiences accustomed to the assertive authorial voice of modern
fiction (Culler 59).
If not judged to be puerile, the apostrophe moving as parenthesis in the
system of substitution is judged to be deceptive and an insertion without
authorization (Dupriez/Halsall 59-60). Interpolating, the speaking subject
turns away from the audience and addresses someone or something, such as
a rose: "O Rose, thou art sick!" This apostrophic gesture of turning away to,
in this case, a rose is characterized as a conventional inherited element
devoid of significance (Culler 60). Through the theme of convention
coupled with a tradition in which tropes pass out of rhetoric's proper
relations with dialectic, the rhetorical moment of the rose indicates the
extraneous and something wrongly inserted. Apostrophe through the lens of
parenthesis constitutes either an insufficiency or a deviation; either way, it
is an insertion in rhetoric with neither dialectic's putative authority nor its
authorization .
The apostrophe is potentially dangerous to the way meaning is created
in the system of substitution. Through metabasis, apostrophes have the
possibility to cross-over into other regions ( heteroiosis ) and create change
into otherness ( alloiosis ) . Because of the danger of disruption, the system
of substitution governs metabasis through synonymia, so that the "other
regions" to which metabasis crosses over are not ''strange" and
"confusing" but "straightforward" and "acceptable." When governed by the
system of substi tution, the metabasis of apostrophe acts as an analogy
governed by synonymia. Governed as such, analogies put like things
together: My love is like a red rose. Nothing incongruent occurs in this
analogy. The congruence of the two -love and the beauty and depth of a
rose's redness – is deemed understandable and appropriate. Deemed as
such, meaning becomes unary. Indeed, incongruence, disruption of the
unary, is to be avoided as a vice of metabasis. If metabasis goes astray,
away from the foundation of the unary system of meaning, its movement is
portrayed as shifty.
As shifty, metabasis brings forward images of the sophists, who through
shifty speech cross ideas over in the minds of auditors, from a familiar
position, or one that would appear to be congruent with a norm, to a different
and often regarded as strange position (such as crossing over and defending
Helen rather than blaming her). Substitution governs metabasis so that its
possi ble movement away from the straight and normal is perceived as a vice,
a movement that involves trickery, obliqueness, and falsity. Because the
vice of
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metabasis is so dangerous to the coherence and stability of the system of
substitution, the system must amplify the figure of synonymia to govern
movement and attenuate the figure of anacolutha. The possibilities of inconsistencies, difference, and change through otherness cannot be free within,
but rather are subjugated by, the system of substitution.
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Alloiosis
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Figure 1.3. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson
Distinct from the system of substitution, the system of transposition is a
space where inconsistency, difference, and change through otherness can
move freely. The crossing-over of metabasis can, again, be understood as
analogy, but not an analogy governed by synonymia. The analogic
movement of metabasis within the system of transposition is governed instead
by anacoloutha, inconsistence. Governed as such, the movement of
metabasis is a transposition of subjects that hitherto seemed radically
inconsistent : "O Rose, thou art sick!" Metabasis governed by anacoloutha
in a system of transposition creates associations through difference.
Difference becomes the incidental, the punctum, "the tiny spark of
accident," releasing meaning from the unary system. Within the system of
transposition, parenthesis interpolates new matter, namely incidentals. In
this way, apostrophes cross-over, move out of, the frame of the thesis. To
return to "O Rose, thou art sick!" this speech differs dramatically from
speech that asserts "The rose is sick!" What is inserted apostrophically is
nothing less than a feeling, specifically deep concern arising in
inconsistence – a rose and a condition of sickness. This insertion of
feeling expressed through inconsistence is, at once, a breaking out of
discourse constrained by rules against the extraneous enforced by dialectic.
The breaking out which is an insertion is a movement toward intense
involvement with the situation described. The insertion of feeling, as well as
the inconsistence, is so strong as to create radical change . The mood of
apostrophe á la parenthesis is imperative .
This insertion through inconsistence, this breaking out spoken in the
imperative, extends to us the possibility to cross-over. Thus metabasis is the
organ of motion in the system of transposition, and it moves like the cuttle-
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fish. As Detienne and Vernant portray this creature, the cuttle-fish moves
obliquely, combining several different directions at once. It is polymorphic
and has pliable tentacles. The metis of the cuttle-fish is "subtle and flexible
as the coming-to-be over which they preside relate not to that which is straight
and direct but to that which is sinuous, undulating and twisting not to be
unchanging and fixed but the mobile and ever-changing; not to what is predetermined and unequivocal but to what is polymorphic and ambiguous"
(160). Moreover, the ink of the cuttle-fish proffers a way of moving, of
getting out. Cuttle-fish carry within them a dark liquid. Aristotle notes that
the cuttle-fish hides its dark liquid. It pretends to move forward but then in
that forward moment, the cuttle-fish inserts its dark ink and turns back .3
Thanks to the digression marked by the ink of the cuttle-fish, apostrophe
refers to the turn and threat that is polymorphic and ambiguous, the turn to a
way through or crossing into different spaces (Detienne 1 61 ).
These different spaces, heteroiosis, within a system of substitution cause
what John Schilb, albeit for slightly different purposes, identified as
"heterophobia," "the sentiment that all rhetoricians must hang together if the
work of rhetoric is to be accomplished'' ( 1 35). Schilb argues that in the study
of rhetoric, mainly for political reasons motivated by the marginalization of
rhetoric within curricula, we fear difference, as if difference causes fractures
in the unified front of rhetoricians in the academy. Difference as such is
feared for its potential divisiveness, its destruction of the unary. But as Schilb
suggests, the only way to be free as rhetoricians is to encounter difference.
We figure this encounter through alloiosis, or becoming different, being
changed, altered, and transformed through experiencing difference and
otherness. Alloiosis is a reflexive figure, marking at once an experience of
heteros (something other) and being radically changed by this experience, so
that the self-experiencing other does not experience it through similitude
and unity but through difference and separation.
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Figure 1 .4. Adapted from "apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; Anderson
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Whereas a traditional image of alloiosis (as the reflexive experience of
being altered by the other) appears in Greek antiquity as the wet nurse
nourishing and altering a child through milk (Hippocrates 16), a radical
image of the other appears in post modernity as a woman givi ng birth to a
child: "The arrival of a child is, I believe, the first and often the only
opportunity a woman has to experience the Other in its radical separation
from herself, that is, as an object of love" (Kristeva interviewed by
Enthoven qtd. in Kristeva Desire in language 1 0). We find significant the
differences between Hippocrates and Julia Kristeva's references to
otherness . Hippocrates ' perspective constructs the woman as nourishing
the child as other, hence constructing the other as dependent. Such
dependence characterizes the other as needy and attached, and creates the
conditions for possession. Kristeva constructs the woman as birthing the
child as other, hence constructing the other as distinct and unattached, as a
radical separation from the self. This point of radical separation constitutes
a moment of reflexivity, where the unary subject (woman with child)
erupts. This eruption arouses the subject into recognizing the other as
distinct and separated, yet as an object of love.
From this image of woman we tum back to apostrophe. The "turning
away" of the apostrophe is a double move .To see apostrophe from within the
system of substitution is to see the other through possession and contraction.
Without being possessed and contracted, the other, from within the system
of substitution, can only display silly talk and false reasoning. If we are not
to miss the opportunities of the other, where the future is nesting, in the
language of Walter Benjamin, then we m ust see apostrophe's double move,
not only its move within a system of substitution but also within a system of
transposition. Apostrophe as such invites us to encounter the other not by
way of conclusion but by way of introduction. The other is therefore not
reduced and subdued, possessed and contracted, but a distinct agent of
difference. The conditions of difference afforded by the other expand and
arouse the self. Such expansion and arousal establishes a surprising, maybe
even disagreeable, contact not only with the other but also with the self.
Even so, the tone is celebratory (Dupriez/Halsall 60) on account of the
recognition of the other as an object of love and the self as distinct from the
unary subject.
In this way. apostrophe is an erotic rhetoric. This apostrophe does not
construct a logos of rhetoric but an eros of rhetoric. As an eros, apostrophe
turns us away from the unary subject, whether this subject is constructed as
the frame of a thesis being presented for the assent of the other, or as the
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frame of a theory of speech . In both cases, whether we are speaking of the
rhetor/audienc e relationship, or the rhetoric/dialectic relation ship, the
change and their attendant differences heighten the possibilities of how
rhetoric can avoid being unary and, thus, free to (re)discover its dy namis of
change. At the very least, the discovery afforded through the figure of
apostrophe is a crossing over from the frame of the unary subject to the
frame of the other. This interanimation is erotic. Thus it should come as no
surprise that in the space of transposition stands Aphrodite whose epithet, of
course, is Apostrophia (Pausanias 9.16.3-4).
In the manner of a manife sto, we say
I . By following a tropological trajectory (as displayed in the rhetorical
tradition) from antistrophe to its subset in catastrophe to its reputed
trivializing gesture in apostrophe, we have gained unique insight into the
constraints in which we employ rhetoric as a theory and critical practice.
2. Tropology is both a way into the tradition and a way out of it.
3. Tropology is consistent with the general trend toward the rhetorical
turn, which foregrounds rhetoric after metaphysics. However, lest we
forget, Aristotle 's Rhetoric has always been after Metaphysi cs. Tropology is
the means by which we radicalize the '"rhetorical turn,··nothing less than
rhetoric at the end of metaphysics.
4. We have not been recovering something lost but searching for the
possibility of reaching to (an) other ...
5. In an antistrophic projection the amplification of dialectic is so loud
that we can't hear the other. In apostrophe, we want to hear the other.
Apostrophe provide s a way to get around the tyranny of antistrophe.
6. If we in rhetoric are bound to a system of rhetoric as the counterpart
of dialectic, do we as rhetorician s have agency? Do we dare write and
speak otherwise?
7. Is not "rhetoric is alltistrophos to dialectic" a choice, what Charles
Pierce calls an abduct ion ? Abduction is a moment upon which a choice is
made . Hayden White identifies that choice as tropological (8). The relation
of rhetoric and dialectic is a commitment that began as a free creation of our
minds. We are committed to the abduction of rhetoric as antistrophe. Can
we decide Otherwise?
8. If Aristotle were to return and write the Rhetoric in the United States,
would he write again "Rhetoric is the anti strophe to dialectic?" And if he
were to write that sentence in 2002 CE, would it make a fresh start? Would
the statement advance the study of rhetoric and our relations to others in the
world?
9. Isn 't the payoff of this kind of writing, then , our freedom? Or are we
as rhetoricans slaves? Can we not try to make a new rhetoric for an Other
world , a world that seeks to live well among idios. Can we n ot on ly care
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about Hippias but also can we develop a rhetori c that takes Hippias into
account?
10. Can we now think of rhetoric as rhetoric?
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Notes
Writers in the sciences are more likely than writers in the humanities to engage in coauthored projects (Ede and Lunsford 157). However, there are good reasons
to collaborate. Collaborators can achieve more together than alone (Ede, Glenn, and
Lunsford). We write together because it is, in effect, a performance of the kind of
change and interactions we seek in a theory and practice of rhetoric .
2 Figuration marks a departure from that method of rhetorical-theory building
which imports resources at a significant cost (to its identity) from other disciplines
(e.g., philosophy, literary criticism, etc.) and exports its tropes to a variety of
disciplines (e.g., psychology, busines s, etc.) for free. The figures we employ are part
of the tradition of rhetoric from Anaximenes to Quintilian. Our work on the tropes is
adapted from Anderson, Burton, Dupriez/Halsall, Preminger, and Sloane.
3 Bekker numbers follow the quoted text parenthetic ally.
4 Presumably, a logical tie means that Aristotle's opening line in the Rhetoric
is read from within the Organon .
5 Kennedy, Grimaldi, Cope, Rainolds . . . these points of entry are but just a
few cynosures in a string of interpretations.
6 For commentary, see Cope, III.94-94 and Kennedy, 239-240.
7 Cf. the "unary subject" in Kristeva 's Desire in Language. In his "Introduction "to Kristeva' s Revolution in Poetic language, Leon S. Roudiez writes,
"[Various] theoretical concepts had previously been formulated in essays written as
early as 1966- 1967 before being brought together in more systematic fashion in
Revolution in Poetic Language . They are roughly contemporaneous with some of
the seminal works published by Roland Barthes , Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault,
Jacques Lacan, and others; she is indebted to some, just as they, in tum , have profited
from her work " (6). At Kristeva 's public ceremony for the State Doctorate , Roland
Barthes is quoted as saying to Kristeva, "Several times you have helped me to
change..." Roudiez notes that Barthes ' remarks display an "unusual
acknowledgment of indebtedness" (10).
8 Barthes ' notion of "punctum" may collapse the sexual (pinning down) with
the incidental (see "Third Meaning"). Our work on the punctum redresses the sense of
pinning down with Benjamin's sense of the incidental (punctum) as the tiny spark of
accident. That tiny spark of accident, that fire of life, is our image of erotics.
9 Practical speech is the very rhetoric that Barthes identifies as vulgar and
academic.
m Insofar as the enthymeme is a figure of speech, the enthymeme 's move can
1
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be understood figuratively (Quinn 27-37; White).
11 Dance and music are two examples of how the system of substitution can be
moved to a system of transposition. Supposing that the meaning of the word antistrophos
borrows from choral song and dance, we wonder which choral dance(s)? In other
words, to what dance(s) might rhetoric apostrophize? There are many. Lillian Lawler
details a multiplicity of dances and corresponding schemas (which bears more
resemblance to an attitude, a gesture, or pose than a figure of speech) that may have
led to distinct motifs in the ancient Greek theater. Drawing upon the scholarship of
Lawler, Green notes that if the strophe denotes a movement of the chorus in one
direction, and the antistrophe is its wheeling in the opposite direction, the structure of
the choral tum requires an epode or "still point." If the relation of rhetoric to dialectic
is like a choral dance, what or where is the epode? No one knows; no one asks this
question; no one has found the epode. Whatever the case, it is at the epode, Green
explains, that the "parallels between ancient Greek choral practice and Aristotle's use
of [antistrop/ws] at 1354a. I fall apart" ("Aristotelian Rhetoric" 8). Given this
understanding, the relation of a dance between rhetoric and dialectic may well act
as a stage metaphor or a stage direction if you will. Being antistrophos to dialectic,
rhetoric might address the owl. In this apostrophe, rhetoric might be staged or
performed according to the "dance of the owl." This particular schema. Lawler invites
us to believe, eventually led to the plot motif of "search" ("Dance of the Owl" 482).
As such, might a schema of the owl pose a unique choral movement between
rhetoric and dialectic that turns meaning toward a "search for . . . ?" Rather than
finding the sayables, perhaps such an owlish posture might give to the language of
rhetoric and dialectic a different sense of what it means to search for knowledge. The
diversity of dances or schemas invites us to experience rhetoric as antistrophos in
other ways as well. Perhaps the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic enacts
the dance of the "snub-nosed hand," a gesture especially common in tragedy
(Lawler, "A Snub-Nosed Hand"). If this particular schema stage or directs the
meaning of antistrophos, could rhetoric·s relation to dialectic be such that each snubs
the other? What would it mean for rhetoric to "snub nose" dialectic and vice versa? In
India, for example. the snub-nose gesture introduces good intent. It welcomes and
shows peace. Can attending to music, a subject incidental to those areas traditionally
involved in rhetoric (ethics, politics, knowledge, justice) provide an opportunity to
reconstitute another system of the rhetoric/dialectic unity? Aristides Quintilianus
wrote On Music in 3 C. E., and in this text he speaks directly to the rhetoric/dialectic
unity (1.1.26). He writes that dialectic and its antistrophos, rhetoric, profit the soul with
judgment (phronesis) only if the soul has been purified first by music. Without
musical purification, the soul cannot benefit from dialectic and rhetoric. Instead the
soul will be led astray, for only music adorns the soul with the beauties of harmony and
proper rhythm. The view of Aristides Quintilianus that develops from this passage in
On Music creates an opportunity to reconstitute the rhetoric/dialectic unity from the
incidental of music. When rhetoric and dialectic come into contact with the incidental
of music, their relationship changes so that at minimum dialectic has no greater claim
to moral high ground than rhetoric. This change might allow rhetoric to be as free to
profit the soul as dialectic -albeit differently, nonetheless equally. Moreover, when
music is acknowledged as taking primary care of the soul, phronesis (judgment) loses
its privilege as the primary means by which the soul is profited . Hence the
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incidental of music shifts the very foundation of the rhetoric and dialectic unity.
12 Fire is that "tiny spark of accident" that allows for a system of change (Benjamin "A Short History of Photography," 202).
13 The cuttle-fish in Aristotle is from The History of Animals and is discussed
in Detienne and Vernant 161; 1 74 n . 142.
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